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authored numerous books and publications. He has also been the president of the Spanish Society of Infertility.Abstract The aim of this study was to assess the lifetime economic benefits of assisted reproduction in Spain by calculating the
return on this investment. We developed a generational accounting model that simulates the flow of taxes paid by the individual,
minus direct government transfers received over the individual’s lifetime. The difference between discounted transfers and taxes
minus the cost of either IVF or artificial insemination (AI) equals the net fiscal contribution (NFC) of a child conceived through assisted
reproduction. We conducted sensitivity analysis to test the robustness of our results under various macroeconomic scenarios. A child
conceived through assisted reproduction would contribute €370,482 in net taxes to the Spanish Treasury and would receive €275,972
in transfers over their lifetime. Taking into account that only 75% of assisted reproduction pregnancies are successful, the NFC was
estimated at €66,709 for IVF-conceived children and €67,253 for AI-conceived children. The return on investment for each euro
invested was €15.98 for IVF and €18.53 for AI. The long-term NFC of a child conceived through assisted reproduction could range from
€466,379 to €-9,529 (IVF) and from €466,923 to €-8,985 (AI). The return on investment would vary between €-2.28 and €111.75 (IVF),
and €-2.48 and €128.66 (AI) for each euro invested. The break-even point at which the financial position would begin to favour the
Spanish Treasury ranges between 29 and 41 years of age. Investment in assisted reproductive techniques may lead to positive
discounted future fiscal revenue, notwithstanding its beneficial psychological effect for infertile couples in Spain.
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Birth and fertility rates in Spain have declined significantly in
recent years. In 2011 the birth rate stood at 10.2 births per
1000 inhabitants, its lowest level since 2003, while the
fertility rate was 1.36 children per woman (INE National
Institute of Statistics, 2014), which is below the replacement
level (2.1). This is partly attributable to the greater
integration of women into the labour market and consequent
delay in maternity (IMW Instituto Max Weber, 2012), but it is
also compounded by the prevalence of infertility, defined as
the inability of one or both partners to conceive naturally after
a year of frequent unprotected sexual intercourse. Infertility
affects 15% of the population in Spain, or one in seven couples
of reproductive age (Matorras Weinig, 2011). Currently, the
Spanish public health system offers two types of assisted
reproduction: IVF and artificial insemination (AI). In both, the
public health system finances a maximum of three IVF cycles
or four AI cycles, or a combination of both techniques,
whether pregnancy is achieved or not. Inclusion criteria for
receiving publicly financed assisted reproduction are women
between 18 and 40 years of age, who are physically and
mentally fit (no definition provided), who have been
classified as infertile according to the previous definition
but have no evidence of a poor ovarian reserve. Priority is
given to nulliparous and infertile couples (Alberto et al.,
2002). In 2010, there were approximately one million
couples requesting assisted reproductive treatment. Only
22% received one or more assisted reproductive treatment
cycles, of which 65% were performed in private facilities. The
average waiting time for an AI or IVF cycle in a public health
facility was 339 days (Matorras Weinig, 2011), so women or
couples who can afford to pay for treatment, and thosewho do
not fulfil inclusion criteria, may choose to go to a private
health facility without a waiting list (Matorras Weinig, 2011).
Therefore, not only is there an excess demand for assisted
reproductive treatment but also inequity of access to that
treatment.
Previous studies have shown that, even under the most
optimistic projections, a declining birth rate combinedwith an
ageing population might result in fiscal imbalances that can
only be mitigated through spending cuts or tax increases (IMW
Instituto Max Weber, 2012; MESS Ministry of Employment,
2006; National Research Council, 2012; Pérez-Camarero et
al., 2012). A higher birth rate would contribute to a
medium-term increase in the taxpaying population and
offset the imbalances caused by the growth of the ageing
population.
In this context, public funding of assisted reproductive
treatment could have a positive effect not only on mitigating
the excess demand and the current inequity in access to
healthcare services, but it could help restore replacement rates
and improve fiscal stability (Pérez-Camarero et al., 2012).
Indeed, beyond the obvious benefit of assisted reprodution
allowing a couple to conceive, generally improving their quality
of life, it could produce a social benefit that goes far beyond thedirect individual benefit, because each individual conceived
contributes a tax flow to society, especially during his/her
working life. Since the individual also ‘costs’ society the amount
of pensions and public services he/she receives, the net benefit
that an individual brings to society is quantifiable as the taxes
paid minus benefits received.
The long-term fiscal implications of public funding of
assisted reproductive treatment have been estimated previ-
ously in countries as diverse as Brazil (Kröger and Ejzenberg,
2012), Denmark (Connolly et al., 2011), Sweden (Svensson et
al., 2008), the UK (Connolly et al., 2009), the USA (Connolly et
al., 2008) and, more recently, Greece (Fragoulakis and
Maniadakis, 2013), The Netherlands (Moolenaar et al., 2014),
Ukraine, Belarus and Kazakhstan (Mandrik et al., 2015). These
studies use generational accounting models that estimate the
social net benefit of an IVF-conceived individual. With the
exception of the Dutch case, they conclude that such funding
would bring net fiscal benefits to the State over the lifetime
of the individual. However, these results are not directly
transferable to Spain, since they apply only within the context
of each country’s own fiscal, healthcare and welfare policies.
In order to investigate whether funding assisted repro-
duction might be considered an efficient use of public
resources in Spain, this analysis models the long-term tax
implications that public funding of assisted reproduction
might have in the country. Using a generational accounting
model, we analyse the fiscal balance of the economic
transfers between the government and an individual con-
ceived through assisted reproductive treatment over his/her
lifetime. Both IVF and AI treatments are considered.
Materials and methods
A generational accounting model was built to estimate the
net fiscal value of an individual conceived through assisted
reproductive treatment (Auerbach et al., 1991, 1992, 1994;
Cardarelli et al., 2000). To analyse the fiscal relationship
between the State and an individual throughout his/her life
cycle the model calculates the sum of all gross income
that the State will receive from the individual, minus direct
transfer expenses throughout his/her lifetime. The net
present value (NPV) of future flows of revenues and transfers
for each individual is as follows:
NPV ¼ ∑
N
t¼0
Tt−Xt
1þ rð Þt
" #
− K0 ð1Þ
where N is the individual’s life expectancy, T is gross
revenues received by the government through taxes paid by
the individual, X is direct transfers to the individual (e.g.
healthcare, education and pensions), K is the cost of
assisted reproductive treatment, r is the discount rate and
t corresponds to 1 year. Revenues and transfers are appor-
tioned to each year of the individual’s life, from age 0 to
the age of life expectancy. We assume that an individual
Table 2 Values assigned to the base case scenario.
Parameter Amount
Annual discount rate (%) 3.5
Annual GDP growth rate (%) 4.08
Annual inflation rate (%) 3.5
Retirement age (years) 65
Unemployment rate (relative to the total population
over 16 years) (%)
10.61
Percentage of public servants in the labour force (%) 7.81
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average individual in terms of education, income, health
status, life expectancy, probability of being unemployed and
likelihood of being a public servant. Therefore, the model
apportions transfers and taxes weighted by the probability of
the individual belonging to any category of taxpayers or
potential recipients (for example, the probability of being
employed, of receiving education grants, of being a business
owner, of being unemployed and receiving unemployment
benefits in any year across his/her lifecycle). The model
adopts the perspective of the Spanish government and
includes the full official list of revenues collected by the
State, which comprise not only taxes paid by individuals in the
labour force, but also those paid by individuals regardless of
age or employment status (e.g. VAT, taxes paid on tobacco,
alcohol, hydrocarbons, etc.). Transfers to individuals include
education, healthcare and pensions from birth to life
expectancy, plus the average cost of IVF or AI cycles needed
to achieve a successful pregnancy, which is assumed only
once, in year zero of the model. For an overview of all
revenues and expenditures, see Table 1.Base year and time horizon
The base year is the hypothetical year of birth of the
individual whose net tax value the model calculates. In the
base case, the model assumes that the base year macroeco-
nomic parameters, especially the rate of economic growth
and the unemployment rate, are constant over the time
horizon. In order to account for possible business cycles
contractions and expansions that will occur during the
lifetime of the individual, we conducted a linear regression
of the annual growth rate of gross domestic product (GDP) in
Spain for the period 1970–2012 (World Bank, 2013). In this
period the average GDP growth rate was 4.09%. The year
with the closest average GDP growth was 2006 with 4.08%,
and this year was therefore set as the base case. All
monetary units were converted into the equivalent of 2006
using the consumer price index (INE National Institute of
Statistics, 2013).
Themodel’s time horizon is the individual’s life expectancy
at birth in Spain in the base year (78 years), which is consistent
with previously published empirical models (Connolly et al.,
2008, 2009, 2011; Fragoulakis and Maniadakis, 2013; Kröger
and Ejzenberg, 2012; Svensson et al., 2008). Table 2 lists theTable 1 Overview of government revenues and expenditures.
Revenue Expenditure
Income tax
Social Security contributions
Corporate tax
Non-resident income tax
Taxes on alcohol consumption
Taxes on tobacco consumption
Tax on petrol and diesel oil
consumption
Value-added tax
Other taxes (electricity, insurances,
sugar consumption, fiscal sanctions).
Cost of assisted
reproduction
Education
Healthcare
Pensions
Governmental
employees’ salaries
Unemployment
benefitsvalues assigned to the main parameters used in the base case
scenario.Discount rate and labour productivity growth
To reflect the depreciation of money over time, we applied
a discount rate of 3.5% on all transfers to and from the
government. This is consistent with discount rates used in
previous studies, which range between 2.5% (Svensson et al.,
2008) and 4.0% (Kröger and Ejzenberg, 2012; Moolenaar et
al., 2014). To account for economic growth over time, costs
were adjusted according to GDP growth rate in the base year
(Auerbach et al., 1999; Cardarelli et al., 2000), which was
4.08% and an annual inflation rate of 3.5%.Cost of assisted reproduction
There are no official data available on the cost of assisted
reproduction in the Spanish public health system. IVF and AI
costs were based on two published studies that estimate
direct healthcare costs of both IVF and AI cycles in two
different Spanish hospitals (Matorras Weinig, 2011; Matorras
et al., 2001; Navarro Espigares et al., 2006). An average
success rate of 28.7% was used to calculate the cost per live
birth (SEF Spanish Fertility Association, 2001). If the
government finances only three assisted reproductive
treatment cycles, the expected investment in assisted
reproduction is €2661 for IVF, and €1424 for AI (2006
costs). The expected average cost of a pregnancy is €4173
for IVF and €3629 for AI. The fact that only 75% of all
pregnancies result in a live birth is taken into account
when modelling expected benefits and costs in the model.
Delivery costs were not considered in the model because
they are assumed to be similar between children conceived
through assisted reproductive treatment and those con-
ceived naturally.Transfers from the government to the individual
Transfers from the government to the individual were
obtained from different sources. In most cases the data are
available at the aggregate level, so we estimated what
the average individual received on each item. When possible
the average by age year is imputed. Otherwise, when data
is available by age groups, the average by age group is
imputed to each age year within the same age group. In the
minority of cases, when age distributions are not available,
116 R Matorras et al.an average per capita is imputed to all years. All data were
obtained for 2006.
The sum of transfers from the government to the citizens
at time t can be expressed as:
Xt ¼ Eit pEitð Þ þ Ht pHtð Þ þWt pWtð Þ þ Pit pPitð Þ þ Ut pUtð Þ;
where E is education, H is healthcare, W is salaries of
governmental employees, and U is unemployment benefits.
Education
Education expenditure by schooling level (categories were:
early childhood and primary education, middle school, high
school, vocational training, and university) and through grants
(non-university and university grants) was obtained from the
Ministry of Education databases (MECD Ministry of Education,
2013). Enrolment rates by age and education level were
obtained from the National Institute of Statistics (INE National
Institute of Statistics, 2008). We calculated the average
transfer by individual for each age and adjusted it to the
proportion of individuals receiving the transfer.
Healthcare
Public healthcare expenditure by age group (0–4, 5–14,
15–44, 45–64, 65–74, N74 years) was obtained from the
Ministry of Health (MSSSI Ministry of Health, 2011) for 2006.
The population size of each of these groups is available from
the Population Data Series (National Institute of Statistics,
2014). We assigned average expenditure by age group to
each corresponding age of the individual.
Pensions
Pensions received by individuals include orphanhood, widow-
hood and retirement pensions. The proportion of pensioners
and the average amount in euros received in each pension
category can be obtained by age (0–78) from the Spanish
Labour Force Survey, which is representative at the national
level and collects information at the individual level (MESS
Ministry of Employment, 2006). We assigned average pensions
to the corresponding age of the individual, from 0 years of age
to 78.
Salaries of governmental employees
This model includes the wages spent by the government on
all governmental employees. Total wages were obtained
from the (MEH Ministry of Finance, 2007). The distribution of
governmental employees by age group (11 age groups from
16 to 85 years of age, grouping years into 5 year-bundles)
is available from the National Institute of Statistics (INE
National Institute of Statistics, 2007). We imputed the
average wage by age group to each year in the life of the
‘individual’.
Unemployment benefits
Average unemployment benefits and unemployment rates
by age group (b25, 26–35, 36–45, 46–55, N55) are availablefrom the Spanish Treasury databases (AT Treasury Statistics
Databases, 2013). We imputed average benefits adjusted by
the proportion of unemployed to each year within the same
age group.
Other transfers
Tax exceptions due to parenthood are implicitly included in
the income tax declared by the individual, which is a transfer
from the individuals to the government in the model. As
opposed to other countries, child benefit payments do not
exist in Spain, and data on paid leave due to parenthood are
not available. These two parameters were therefore not
included in the model.
Transfers from the individual to the government
The sum of transfers received by the government from the
individual at time t is:
Tt ¼ SSt þ Iit þ Ct þ Nt þ At þ Ht þ VATt þ Tobt þ Oit;
where SS stands for Social Security contributions, I is income
tax, C is corporate tax, N is non-resident income tax, A is tax
paid on alcohol and beer consumption, H is tax paid on petrol
and diesel, Tob is tax paid on tobacco consumption, VAT is
value added tax, and O refers to other transfers.
Social Security contributions
In Spain all employed persons pay a Social Security contribution.
Contributions are age- and employment regime-dependent. We
used the Spanish Labour Survey (MESS Ministry of Employment,
2006), which collects information on Social Security contribu-
tions at the individual level to calculate the proportion of
persons working by age and the average contribution by age.
The average contribution was weighted according to the
proportion of individuals working in each age year (0–78) and
the result was imputed to each year of age of the hypothetical
individual in the model.
Income tax
This category includes the income tax paid by employed
individuals in the private sector (including self-employed)
and public sector employed individuals. Private sector
income tax is available at the individual level from the
Spanish Labour Force Survey (MESS Ministry of Employment,
2006). Income tax paid by the public sector working force is
available at the aggregate level from the Treasury’s annual
report (AT Treasury Annual Report, 2008). The number and
proportion of public sector workers in 2006 is available from
the National Institute of Statistics (INE National Institute of
Statistics, 2007). We calculated average private sector income
tax by age and category (employed and self-employedworkers)
and public sector income tax per public sector worker. We
weighed these averages by the proportion of people working
under each category (employed, self-employed and public
sector worker) at each age using official employment statistics
(INE National Institute of Statistics, 2007), and imputed the
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model.
Corporate tax
Corporate tax is paid by business owners, and is available at
the aggregate level from the Treasury’s Annual Report
(AT Treasury Annual Report, 2008). The number of business
owners is available from official employment statistics
(INE National Institute of Statistics, 2007) by 5-year age
groups from age 16 onwards. Average tax per business owner
was adjusted for the proportion of business owners in each
age group.
Non-resident income tax
This tax is paid by Spaniards living abroad. It is available at
the aggregate level from the Treasury’s Annual Report (AT
Treasury Annual Report, 2008). The number of non-residents
is reflected in the National Register of Non-Resident Spaniards
(INE National Institute of Statistics, 2009a, 2009b) by 5-year
age groups from age 15 onwards. Average tax per non-resident
was adjusted for the proportion of non-residents in each age
group.
Taxes on alcohol and tobacco consumption
The revenue from alcohol and beer, and tobacco consump-
tion are available from the Spanish Treasury Annual Report
(AT Treasury Annual Report, 2008) at the aggregate level.
The proportion of alcohol consumers and of smokers are
available from the Spanish data in the European Health
Interview Survey (INE National Institute of Statistics, 2009a,
2009b). Spain joined this survey in 2009, so no data are
available for 2006. We assumed that the proportion of the
population who drink and smoke in 2006 were the same as in
2009. We calculated average tax per alcohol consumer and
average tax per smoker and adjusted them by the proportion
of alcohol consumers and smokers by age, respectively.
Tax on petrol and diesel oil consumption
The revenue from the sale of petrol and diesel is available
from the Spanish Treasury Annual Report (AT Treasury Annual
Report, 2008) at the aggregate level. The Spanish Drivers
Census (MIDGT Ministry of Interior, 2008) offers the number of
persons who own a driver’s licence by 5-years age categories,
from the age of 13. The average tax per driver was adjusted by
the proportion of drivers in each age category.
Value added tax
The revenue from VAT is available from the Spanish Treasury
Annual Report (AT Treasury Annual Report, 2008) at the
aggregate level. We calculated a per capita VAT from age 17.
Other transfers from the individuals to the government
Other transfers include taxes paid for inheritance, electric-
ity, insurances, sugar consumption, and fiscal sanctions. Allare available from the Spanish Treasury Annual Report
(AT Treasury Annual Report, 2008) at the aggregate level.
We calculated a per capita taxes from age 18.
Sensitivity analysis
Due to the uncertainty of the country’s economic growth,
and to test the robustness of the model’s results in a
scenario of economic crisis, one-way deterministic sensitiv-
ity analysis was performed. The analysis included eight
different scenarios where we vary, either alone or com-
bined, those parameters most likely to change in the future
and to have an impact on the results: discount rate (1% and
5%), GDP growth rate (±100%), inflation rate (±100%), and
unemployment rate (±100%).
Results
Fig. 1 shows the cumulative discounted net fiscal contribu-
tion of an average individual conceived through assisted
reproductive treatment with IVF. Investment is done in year
zero, which explains why the first value of the curve is
negative. During the first years of life, children are net
recipients of public transfers, which, from the government
perspective, represents a cumulative deficit between birth
and 18 years. At this age, the curve reaches a turning point:
taxes paid by the individual, either through consumption or
work, are higher than what he/she receives for education,
healthcare, unemployment or other benefits. At approxi-
mately age 39, the state revenues and accrued expenses
come into balance. From that age, an average individual
starts to contribute more in taxes than he/she receives in
transfers until retirement age. During retirement, individ-
uals typically consume more public benefits, such as
pensions and healthcare, compared with their consumption
over their working life. This explains the negative slope of
the curve drawn from retirement age to 78 years, the life
expectancy of the individual.
Table 3 shows the results obtained in the base case
scenario for a naturally conceived individual and an individual
conceived through either IVF or AI, if the government were to
fully fund all cycles required to obtain a pregnancy, and if it
were to finance only three cycles of either assisted reproduc-
tive technique, as it currently does in Spain. These results take
into account that only 75% of pregnancies conceived through
assisted reproduction result in a live birth and present the
revenues raised through taxes, state transfers to individuals
(including the cost of IVF or AI), the NFC of the individual
in present value, with and without assisted reproduction, the
break-even age point, which is the age at which state
expenses (including expenditure on assisted reproduction)
equal revenues, and the return on investment for every euro
spent on assisted reproduction in year zero.
In the base case, the present value of all taxes paid by a
naturally conceived individual equals €370,482, while the
transfers made to the individual add up to €275,972.
Therefore, the NFC of a naturally conceived individual
throughout his/her lifetime is €94,510. In year zero the cost
of achieving a live birth through IVF (taking into account the
total number of IVF cycles needed for conception and the
probability of the pregnancy resulting in a live birth) is
Fig. 1 Cumulative individual net fiscal contribution: base case scenario. ART = assisted reproductive techniques.
118 R Matorras et al.€4173 while that of AI is €3629. Therefore, in the base case
scenario, an individual conceived through assisted repro-
duction will have a NFC over his/her life cycle of €66,709 if
conceived through IVF and of €67,253 if conceived through
AI. These results imply returns on investment of €15.98 and
€18.53 for every euro invested in IVF and AI, respectively.
If the government were to finance only the first three
cycles of either assisted reproductive technique (as it does
now) as opposed to financing the necessary cycles to reach a
pregnancy, the expected cost of a successful pregnancy
would equal €2661 if conceived through IVF and €1424 if
conceived through AI, and the net fiscal contributions would
be €42,528 for an individual conceived through IVF and
€26,387 for an individual conceived through AI, which imply
returns on investment of €15.98 and €18.53, respectively.Table 3 Results of investing on an assisted reproduction
pregnancy and on three assisted reproductive cycles: base case
scenario.
As many cycles as
needed to obtain
one pregnancy a
Three
cycles
Naturally
conceived
individual
Taxes received (€) 370,482
Transfers to
individual (€) 275,972
NFC (€) 94,510
IVF-conceived
individual b
Expected NFC (€) 70,883 45,190
Expected NFC minus
IVF cost (€) 66,709 42,529
Break-even age
(years) 39 39
Return on
investment (€) 15.98 15.98
AI-conceived
individual c
Expected NFC (€) 70,883 27,811
Expected NFC minus
AI cost (€) 67,253 26,387
Break-even age 39 39
Return on
investment (€)
18.53 18.53
a Probability of successful pregnancy is 0.75.
b Number of cycles needed for pregnancy = 3.48.
c Number of cycles needed for pregnancy = 6.53.The return on investment does not vary depending on
whether the government decides to finance only three
cycles or the total number of cycles required for conception,
because the expected benefits increase in the same
proportion as the expected costs.
Sensitivity analysis
Table 4 shows the results obtained in the sensitivity analysis
for an individual conceived through either IVF or AI, if the
government were to fully fund all cycles required to obtain
a pregnancy. In this case, the NFC of an IVF-conceived
individual over her lifetime would vary between €466,379
(scenario 8, which assumes that the GDP growth rate
doubles, inflation rate doubles, and unemployment rate is
equal to zero) and €-9529 (scenario 7, which assumes a GDP
growth rate equal to zero, an inflation rate equal to zero,
and an unemployment rate that doubles the one in the base
case). The NFC of an AI-conceived individual over his/her life
cycle would range from €466,923 to €-8985, under the same
scenarios. The age at which expenses and revenues balance out
in individuals conceived through assisted reproduction ranges
from 29 years to 41 years, which is similar to the break-even
age in previous studies: USA, 34 years (Connolly et al., 2008);
Brazil, 40 years (Kröger and Ejzenberg, 2012); Denmark, 39
years (Connolly et al., 2011); UK, 36 years (Connolly et al.,
2009); and Sweden, 41 years (Svensson et al., 2008). See Fig. 2.
Table 5 shows the results obtained in the base case scenario
and the sensitivity analysis for a an individual conceived
through ART if the government were to finance only three
cycles of either ART technique, as it currently does in Spain.
Figs. 3 and 4 show the return on investment obtained in
the sensitivity analysis for an individual conceived through
either IVF or AI, respectively, if the government were to
fund fully all cycles required to obtain a pregnancy. The
return on investment per individual conceived through
assisted reproduction ranges from €111.75 to €-2.28 for IVF
and from €128.66 to €-2.48 for AI.
Discussion
This is the first empirical study that estimates the NFC of an
individual conceived through assisted reproduction in Spain.
Table 4 Results of investing on an assisted reproduction pregnancy: sensitivity analysis.
Scenario Varied parameters(%)
a IVF-conceived individual b AI-conceived individual c
Expected
NFC d (€)
Expected NFC
minus IVF cost (€)
Break-even
age (years)
Expected
NFC d (€)
Expected NFC
minus AI cost (€)
Break-even
age (years)
1 g -100; i -100 968.28 -3,205.13 39 968.28 -2,660.94 39
2 g +100; i +100 416,613.38 412,439.96 30 416,613.38 412,984.16 30
3 d = 1 249,807.82 245,634.40 30 249,807.82 246,178.60 30
4 d = 5 24,498.09 20,324.67 37 24,498.09 20,868.87 37
5 U -100 82,594.64 78,421.23 33 82,594.64 78,965.42 33
6 U +100 43,368.84 39,195.43 35 43,368.84 39,739.63 35
7 g -100; i -100; U +100 -5,355.40 -9,528.81 41 -5355.40 -8,984.61 41
8 g +100; i +100; U -100 470,552.39 466,378.97 29 470,552.39 466,923.17 29
a g = GDP growth rate; I = inflation rate; d = discount rate; U = unemployment rate. -100% indicates that the parameter becomes zero and
+100% indicates that the original value of the parameter is doubled.
b Number of cycles needed for pregnancy = 3.48.
c Number of cycles needed for pregnancy = 6.53.
d Probability of successful pregnancy = 0.75.
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Previous studies that have calculated the NFC for the life
cycle of an IVF-conceived individual have shown that this can
vary, but that, with the exception of The Netherlands
(Moolenaar et al., 2014), it remains positive even in
economic crisis scenarios: USD 61,428 in Brazil (Kröger and
Ejzenberg, 2012); GBP 109,939 in the UK (Connolly et al.,
2009); USD 155,870 in the USA (Connolly et al., 2008); SEK
254,000 in Sweden (Svensson et al., 2008); €154,100 in
Denmark (Connolly et al., 2011); and €60,435 in Greece
(Fragoulakis and Maniadakis, 2013). Our study indicates that
public funding of assisted reproductive techniques is likely
to result in a positive fiscal return for the Spanish Treasury.
In the base case scenario, an IVF-conceived individual would
have an NFC of €66,709, and each euro invested in assisted
reproduction results in tax benefits of €15.98 to the State,
while these figures are €67,253 and€18.53 in the case of
AI-conceived individuals, which implies that AI represents
a better investment compared with IVF. The NFC by an
individual conceived through assisted reproduction remains
positive in almost every circumstance in the sensitivityFig. 2 Lifetime net tax contributions and break-even ages for in
analyses (Connolly et al., 2008; Kröger and Ejzenberg, 2012). ART =analysis for both techniques and also in the case where
the government were to fund only three cycles of either
technique, as is currently the case in Spain.
Our model is significantly more accurate than most
previous empirical models for several reasons. First, previ-
ous empirical models assume that an individual’s economic
life cycle can be divided into specific periods depending on
his/her age (for example: ‘childhood’ (0–19 years), ‘working
years’ (20–64 years), ‘senior years’ (65 + years)) in which the
same average transfers and taxes are apportioned for all
individuals belonging to the same periods, and regardless of
exact age, true schooling level or working status (Connolly et
al., 2008, 2009, 2011; Fragoulakis and Maniadakis, 2013;
Kröger and Ejzenberg, 2012; Svensson et al., 2008). In our
model, Treasury revenue and expenditure are apportioned
in each year of the individual’s age, from age 0 to the
age of life expectancy (78 years in this case) as weighted
averages due to the probability (based on official statistical
proportions) of belonging to a particular social group such
as student, grant recipient, unemployed, public servant,
pensioner, etc. In this way, in our model the ‘average’dividuals conceived through assisted reproduction in previous
assisted reproductive techniques.
Table 5 Results of investing on three assisted reproduction cycles: sensitivity analysis.
Scenario Varied parameters (%)
a IVF-conceived individual b AI-conceived individual c
Expected
NFC d (€)
Expected NFC
minus IVF cost (€)
Break-even
age (years)
Expected
NFC d (€)
Expected NFC
minus AI cost (€)
Break-even
age (years)
1 g -100; i -100 617.31 -2,043.38 39 379.91 -1,044.03 39
2 g +100; i +100 265,604.74 262,944.05 30 163,460.17 162,036.23 30
3 d = 1 159,260.70 156,600.01 30 98,013.24 96,589.30 30
4 d = 5 15,618.34 12,957.65 37 9,611.94 8,188.00 37
5 U -100 52,656.80 49,996.11 33 32,406.38 30,982.45 33
6 U +100 27,649.07 24,988.38 35 17,015.96 15,592.03 35
7 g -100; i -100; U +100 -3,414.24 -6074.93 41 -2,101.21 -3,525.15 41
8 g +100; i +100; U -100 299,992.63 297,331.94 29 184,623.38 183,199.44 29
a g = GDP growth rate; I = inflation rate; d = discount rate; U = unemployment rate. -100% indicates that the parameter becomes zero and
+100% indicates that the original value of the parameter is doubled.
b Number of cycles needed for pregnancy = 3.48.
c Number of cycles needed for pregnancy = 6.53.
d Probability of successful pregnancy = 0.75.
120 R Matorras et al.individual represents all sectors of society. Second, unlike
other studies where all taxes charged are generally limited
to income tax and value added tax per capita, our data
sources allow us to include the full official list of individual
taxes collected by the Spanish Treasury, including not only
taxes paid by individuals in the labour force, but also those
paid by individuals regardless of age or employment status
(e.g. taxes paid on tobacco, alcohol, petrol, etc.).
Of course, this model, like all mathematical representations
of real-life situations, also has limitations. First, the model
estimates the tax benefits that public funding of assisted
reproduction would have in women up to 40 years of age.
Although performing assisted reproductive techniques in
women over 40 years of age has lower associated rates of
success, studies in other countries also obtain positive – though
less substantial – NFC for individuals born to women over 40. In
Spain the public health system finances assisted reproduction
only for women up to 40 years of age, a restriction that
influences our data. We believe it would be beneficial to
carry out a study that would include the costs of financing
pregnancies in women over 40 years, to see whether public
resources would be well invested in age ranges above 40.
Second, it is important to consider that 20% of IVF
pregnancies are multiple (Sunderam et al., 2012). Data on
the incidence of multiple pregnancies in Spain is not
available, but it is sensible to forecast that with more than
one individual born after assisted reproduction funding, theFig. 3 Tornado diagram: the return on investment of an IVF
pregnancy.return on investment would be multiplied by the number of
children produced. Moreover, many individuals conceived
through assisted reproduction eventually have children of
their own, who in turn might contribute a positive NFC to
the government. On the other hand, the risk of premature
labour in multiple pregnancies is greater than in single births
(Kurdi et al., 2004; Pandian et al., 2005). Although no data are
available for Spain, in the literature this risk ranges between
42% and 33.4%, versus 12.2% and 6.4% in single births (Janvier
et al., 2011; Kurdi et al., 2004). Fifty per cent of premature
births have prenatal complications (Janvier et al., 2011). If
funding of assisted reproduction increases in Spain, further
funding will probably be necessary to cover the extra costs
associated with premature births. Our model does not include
the additional healthcare costs associated with the care of
premature infants with complications. The inclusion of this
data would enrich the accuracy of the results.
Third, since this analysis is performed from the perspective
of the Spanish Treasury, our results do not include the
estimated individual benefits in terms of quality of life that
conceiving provides for couples who suffer from infertility, even
extending to the ‘peace of mind’ experienced by those couples
who should they fail to conceive, know that they have tried
everything. Inclusion of the psychological and social benefits of
artificial conception would reveal even greater advantages
associatedwith public funding of assisted reproduction. Finally,
our results are only applicable to Spain.Fig. 4 Tornado diagram: the return on investment of an AI
pregnancy.
121Long-term fiscal implications of funding assisted reproductionIn conclusion, an increase in public funding for assisted
reproductive techniques in Spain might have positive effects
in at least three respects. Notwithstanding the fact that
general accounting is only a speculation, our results show
that public funding of assisted reproduction might lead to
positive net fiscal results for the Spanish Treasury during the
life cycles of children conceived through assisted reproduc-
tion. Moreover, it would decrease the problem of lack of
access to healthcare service, while most likely improving
equity in access to the service and quality of life of infertile
couples.
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